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Young children often perseverate, engaging in previously correct, but no longer appro-
priate behaviors. One account posits that such perseveration results from the use of
stimulus-specific representations of a situation, which are distinct from abstract, gener-
alizable representations that support flexible behavior. Previous findings supported this
account, demonstrating that only children who flexibly switch between rules could gener-
alize their behavior to novel stimuli. However, this link between flexibility and generalization
might reflect general cognitive abilities, or depend upon similarities across the measures
or their temporal order. The current work examined these issues by testing the specificity
and generality of this link. In two experiments with 3-year-old children, flexibility was mea-
sured in terms of switching between rules in a card-sorting task, while abstraction was
measured in terms of selecting which stimulus did not belong in an odd-one-out task.
The link between flexibility and abstraction was general across (1) abstraction dimensions
similar to or different from those in the card-sorting task and (2) abstraction tasks that
preceded or followed the switching task. Good performance on abstraction and flexibility
measures did not extend to all cognitive tasks, including an IQ measure, and dissociated
from children’s ability to gaze at the correct stimulus in the odd-one-out task, suggesting
that the link between flexibility and abstraction is specific to such measures, rather than
reflecting general abilities that affect all tasks. We interpret these results in terms of the
role that developing prefrontal cortical regions play in processes such as working memory,
which can support both flexibility and abstraction.
Keywords: executive functions, cognitive flexibility, abstract reasoning, cognitive development
INTRODUCTION
Children demonstrate remarkable limitations in executive func-
tions, including cognitive flexibility. For example, when asked to
sort cards first by one rule (e.g., shape) and later sort the same
cards by another rule (e.g., color) in the dimensional change card-
sort task (DCCS), 3-year-olds reliably perseverate by continuing
to sort cards by the previously correct, but no longer appropriate
rule, even after explicit, repeated instructions to switch to the new
rule (Zelazo et al., 1996; Kirkham et al., 2003;Yerys and Munakata,
2006; Kloo et al., 2008). Even 8- to-10-year-old children often per-
severate on the old rule in the related Wisconsin Card Sort Task
(Crone et al., 2006),andperseveration is not completely eliminated
even in typical adults (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000).
What causes such limitations in executive function? Prominent
accounts of perseveration posit that children who successfully
switch to new behaviors and children who perseverate on old
behaviors differ in processes that operate on representations of
the basic sorting rules, and not in how the basic rules them-
selves are represented. For example, the attentional inertia account
posits that perseverators may know the new rule they should
be following, but fail to inhibit attending to the previously cor-
rect dimension (Kirkham et al., 2003). The redescription account
posits that perseverators can conceptualize a conflicting stimulus
in a single way (e.g., as a red one), but lack the understanding that
objects can be described in several ways and thus fail to redescribe
stimulus objects in terms of alternative dimensions or perspec-
tives (e.g., as a truck; Perner and Lang, 2002; Kloo and Perner,
2003; Kloo et al., 2008). A version of the cognitive complexity and
control account (CCC-r; Zelazo et al., 2003) posits that persevera-
tion results in part from an inability to activate new rules (e.g., to
sort by color), as a result of having ignored the associated features
(e.g., red and blue) while following the previous rule (e.g., shape;
Muller et al., 2006).
Alternative accounts posit that switchers and perseverators are
relying on distinct types of basic rule representations (Munakata,
1998; Zelazo et al., 2003;Marcovitch et al., 2007; Towse et al., 2007;
Chevalier and Blaye, 2008). For example, according to an active–
latent account (Morton and Munakata, 2002), switchers represent
task-relevant information (e.g., this is the “shape” game) actively,
via neuronal firing in prefrontal cortical (PFC) regions. These
active representations serve to maintain currently task-relevant
information in working memory, thus supporting flexible switch-
ing to new tasks (Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1992), as well as
faster responses to questions about the task (Blackwell et al., 2009).
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Consistent with this working memory account,when children and
adults switch to a new rule on the DCCS, they activate the fron-
toparietal network, including the dorsolateral PFC and the inferior
frontal junction (Morton et al., 2009), regions that are activated in
working memory tasks (Cole and Schneider, 2007).
In addition to supporting flexible switching, these prefrontal
active working memory representations can encode information
in an abstract or categorical form, collapsing across specific idio-
syncratic details in the service of forming explicit superordinate
categories, which could be applied outside of the learned context
and in novel situations (Bunge et al., 2003; Badre et al., 2010).
For example, relatively abstract categories of “color” or “shape” or
“orientation” should help to generalize information across distinct
features, such as “red,”“blue,”“truck,”“flower,” or “vertical”). Sim-
ilarly, the PFC also supports integrating abstract information to
form analogies, or abstract relations between items or categories
(Green et al., 2006;Wendelken et al., 2008; Badre et al., 2010; Speed,
2010). In contrast, perseverators represent information latently
according to the active–latent account, through changes in neu-
ronal connections in posterior cortical areas, which are thought
to encode information in a more stimulus-specific, detailed, and
graded form (Miller and Desimone, 1994; Jog et al., 1999).
The active–latent account makes a counterintuitive prediction
regarding the development of flexibility: despite the fact that per-
severators seem completely stuck on sorting by a particular rule,
they should struggle with the task of sorting a new item by that
rule. That is, perseverators’more stimulus-specific representations
should preclude generalization of their behavior to novel cards,
whereas switchers’ more abstract representations should allow
them to apply their sorting rule to novel cards. This prediction
has been confirmed (Kharitonova et al., 2009). Across two experi-
ments, only 3-year-oldswho switched flexibly in theDCCS applied
their behavior to sorting novel cards. For example, after switching
from sorting blue trucks and red flowers by color to sorting them
by shape, children next generalized their behavior to novel cards
(e.g., sorting a teal TV with a similarly boxy red truck target, and
sorting an orange ball with a similarly round blue flower target). In
contrast, perseverators performed at chance in generalizing their
perseverative behavior to these novel cards.
This study provided the first demonstration of a striking differ-
ence between switchers’ and perseverators’ representations of rules
guiding their behavior. These findings are consistent with theoret-
ical perspectives that emphasize the importance of abstract rep-
resentations in supporting cognitive flexibility and other domains
of higher-order cognition (Vygotsky, 1962; Jacques and Zelazo,
2001, 2005; Wallis et al., 2001; Gentner, 2003; Zelazo et al., 2003;
Rougier et al., 2005; Bunge and Zelazo, 2006; Pasnak et al., 2009;
Fisher,2011)1. In contrast, these findings are counterintuitive from
the perspective of alternative accounts that assume switchers and
1We note that this finding was originally described (in Kharitonova et al., 2009) as
a challenge to CCC theory due to the focus of this theory on children’s difficulty
with switching between rules; however, several descriptions of this account indicate
compatibility with these findings. CCC theory posits that perseverators are capable
of following basic, lower-order rules (e.g., knowing where trucks go in the shape
game), but lack the ability to navigate among the higher-order rules (e.g., knowing
whether to follow the rules of the shape game vs. the color game; e.g., Zelazo et al.,
1996). For example, “Although 3–4 year olds are capable of either description, they
perseverators represent basic rules in the same way, and differ only
in processes that operate on these rules. If switchers and persevera-
tors are sorting by the color or shape rule in the same way, why can
only switchers sort novel colors or shapes correctly? That is, why
should perseverators fail to generalize the rule they are currently
using, if they simply lack: (a) the inhibitory mechanisms to stop
sorting cards by this rule (e.g., Kirkham et al., 2003), or (b) abil-
ity to redescribe stimuli according to a new rule (e.g., Perner and
Lang, 2002; Kloo and Perner, 2003; Kloo et al., 2008), or (c) the
ability to activate a new rule as a result of having ignored it earlier
(Muller et al., 2006)? Thus, the finding that switchers and perse-
verators represent sorting rules at different levels of abstraction
poses a challenge to prominent accounts of cognitive flexibility.
However, other interpretations are possible. For example, alter-
native accountsmight explain the observed link between flexibility
and abstraction by appealing to factors that are not specific to
flexibility or abstraction. This relationship might reflect a general
cognitive advantage for switchers who might excel across tasks,
regardless of whether they depend on the development of the
PFC. To test this possibility, we investigate the specificity of the
flexibility–abstraction link, by also including a perceptual prim-
ing task thought to rely on maturity of occipital regions rather
than PFC regions (Gabrieli et al., 1995; Schacter and Buckner,
1998; Schott et al., 2002; Henson, 2003). If switchers’ advantage
is not specific to tasks that require prefrontal active and abstract
representations (contrary to Kharitonova et al.’s interpretation),
switchers should also perform better on the perceptual priming
measure. In addition,we include the spatial reasoning subtest of an
established IQ measure, KABC-II (Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004)
to test if the flexibility–abstraction link is mediated by aspects of
intelligence.
Alternative accounts might also posit that the observed link
between flexibility and abstraction is a by-product of the two tasks
relying on the same dimensions, instead of reflecting a domain–
general relationship. That is, the previously reported link suggests
that the ability to maintain an active representation that supports
switching to a particular dimension (e.g., color) is linked to hav-
ing an abstract representation and subsequent generalization to
that same dimension (e.g., color). It is unclear whether this link
holds only when the dimension relevant for abstraction is identical
have difficulty switching flexibly between them” (Zelazo et al., 2003, p. 101). “Notice
that when similar tasks only require reasoning within a single dimension, 3-year-
olds perform well” (Zelazo et al., 2003, p. 103). Based on descriptions like these,
Kharitonova et al. (2009) argued that according to CCC theory, it is not clear why
perseverators who are capable of sorting by one rule (color or shape) would fail to
continue this behavior with new stimuli, when no flexible switching to a new rule is
required. However, CCC theory also posits that the ability to contrast different rules
(as required for switching) is inherently linked to a concept of the underlying dimen-
sions. For example, “Being able to reflect on color rules as color rules that contrast
with shape rules (or rules from any other dimension) would seem to be required to
comprehend the way in which different colors form a coherent category of variation
(i.e., a dimension).”And “Indeed, according to CCC theory, the ability to formulate
higher-order rules is necessary for the construction of the concept of dimensions,
and for subsequent analytical processing of values on those dimensions. As Zelazo
and Frye (1997) suggested, it is only by distancing themselves from discriminations
within a dimension and considering two or more dimensions in contradistinction
that children are able to conceptualize dimensions qua dimensions (see also Smith,
1989)” (Zelazo et al., 2003).
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to the dimension relevant for switching. Much of knowledge
acquired early in development is gained in a piecemeal fashion
(e.g., Tomasello, 2000), such that the ability to flexibly switch
to one dimension or category (e.g., color) might not be linked
to abstracting another dimension (e.g., orientation). In contrast,
these links might develop in a more integrated fashion, based on
their reliance on common mechanisms, such that active represen-
tations of one dimension are linked to abstract representations of
other dimensions. One example of how this process might occur
was demonstrated in a neural network model, in which a simu-
lated PFC system that could actively maintain information was
also able to extract all the relevant dimensions in the environ-
ment (e.g., shape, size, color) after a sufficient breadth of exposure
(Rougier et al., 2005). Thus, to determine the generality of the
earlier-reported link, we include a task that requires abstraction
of a dimension (orientation) that is different from the dimensions
used in the DCCS flexibility task (color or shape).
In addition, we test the generality of the flexibility–abstraction
linkby testingwhether it dependsupon switchingpreceding gener-
alization. The previous finding showed that switchers generalized
their behavior to a subsequent task, while perseverators did not.
In the current studies, we assess abstraction before testing switch-
ing, using an odd-one-out task in which children were asked to
select one picture that did not belong with three others2. This
task requires abstraction because it cannot be solved based purely
on the perceptual characteristics of the attributes themselves; the
same stimulus can be the odd-one-out in one grouping but not
in another grouping. Thus, relations between attributes need to
be considered to determine the “odd” stimulus (Chalmers and
Halford, 2003); this comparison processmight be essential for pro-
moting abstract thought (Christie and Gentner, 2010; Son et al.,
2010). If children who flexibly switch from one rule to another
also show better abstraction in this preceding odd-one-out task,
this would suggest that the flexibility–abstraction relationship
is more general rather than being dependent on first activating
representations for switching.
Based on the active–latent framework, we predict both speci-
ficity and generality of the link between abstraction and flexibility.
We predict that this link is general across different measures of
abstraction and flexibility and orderings of these measures, while
being specific to these measures over other measures that do
not depend on active, abstract PFC representations. Addressing
these questions about the specificity and generality of the link
between children’s flexible switching and abstract representations
is a critical step toward reconciling conflicting theories about the
development of cognitive flexibility and better understanding of
the mechanisms supporting the development of flexible thought.
EXPERIMENT 1
We tested the generality of the flexibility–abstraction link by giving
children: (1) an odd-one-out shape or color task just before they
2Abstraction has been measured before switching in the Flexible Item Selection Task
as well (Jacques and Zelazo, 2001), in which children must select two out of three
items that match on one dimension (a measure of abstraction), and then select
a different two out of the items that match on another dimension (a measure of
switching). However, because abstraction is a prerequisite for assessing switching in
this paradigm, the two constructs could not be assessed independently.
needed to flexibly switch to sorting cards by the same dimension,
and (2) an odd-one-out task in a new dimension (orientation)
after they needed to flexibly switch to sorting cards by shape or
color. We tested the specificity of the flexibility–abstraction link
by assessing performance on a perceptual priming measure.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-seven 3-year-olds (M= 3.3 years, range: 2.9–3.8 years; 33
boys) participated (22 in the shape to color condition 25 in color
to shape). One child failed to finish all tasks included in the ses-
sion, and is therefore only included in analyses of those tasks that
were completed. Two additional children were excluded from all
analyses due to mixed behavior in the postswitch phase. Partic-
ipants were recruited from a departmental participant pool or
from local preschools. This study was approved by the University
of Colorado Institutional ReviewBoard and informed consent was
obtained from a parent of each participant before testing. Children
received a small prize and the parents of participants tested in the
laboratory were paid $5 for travel expenses.
Design and procedure
The experiment consisted of five phases (Figure 1) and lasted
20–30min.
(1) Preswitch: The experimenter first named the game and
explained the rule (“Today we are going to play a game called
the shape game. In the shape game, trucks go here and flowers
go here.”). The experimenter then demonstrated the game by
sorting two sorting cards facedown into the appropriate trays.
The sorting cards (blue trucks and red flowers) matched each
target (red truck or blue flower) on only one dimension. The
child was then invited to participate (“Now it’s your turn to
play!”) and for each of the subsequent six preswitch trials, the
rule was reiterated (“Remember, in the shape game, trucks go
here and flowers go here.”) and feedback was given (“Good
job!” if correct or “No, trucks go here in the shape game.”).
(2) Odd-one-out, preswitch: To assess the generality of the
flexibility–abstraction link, we adapted a measure that would
allowus to test abstraction separate from the card-sorting task.
In thismeasure (based onChalmers andHalford,2003; Pasnak
et al., 2009; also reviewed in Henry and Bettenay, 2010), chil-
dren were asked to select the one picture that did not belong
with the others. Each of the five odd-one-out trials included
four color patches or four shapes, arranged in a two-by-two
table, and printed on a single sheet of paper. In each set, one
of the four pictures was the “odd-one-out” on the basis of
either color (e.g., three warm colors and one cool color) or
shape (e.g., three angular and one rounded shape). This task
is thought to measure abstraction because it requires partici-
pants to select an answer based on overarching category, such
as “warm color,” instead of based on specific, idiosyncratic
features of each item.
The dimension of this first odd-one-out task (i.e., color
or shape) matched the dimension to be used in the sub-
sequent postswitch phase, because one of our original goals
was to investigate the effect of exposure to different levels
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Dimensional Change Card Sort and Odd-one-out tasks: The
DCCS sorting cards are shown under the corresponding target cards, for a
sample preswitch and postswitch. (B) Perceptual priming task: Pictures
were presented in a random, but constant order. “Old” and “new” lists
were counterbalanced, and constructed such that each list contained the
same number of items from various categories, such as animals and
household items.
of abstraction (broad vs. narrow) on subsequent switching3.
However, the manipulation of broad vs. narrow categories did
not influence switch rates (Wald’s< 0.1), possibly because the
broad categories were not sufficiently broad to activate an
abstract category of color. Therefore, we focus on the more
meaningful individual differences in children’s performance
on the odd-one-out task (collapsed across broad and narrow
categories) and their ability to switch on DCCS. Exposure
to the same dimension used in postswitch also did not con-
tribute to any flexibility–abstraction link by priming children
to the postswitch dimension, a point elaborated in the Section
“Discussion.”
3Our prediction was that odd-one-out-trials based on relatively broad categories
(e.g., warm vs. cool colors) might make it easier for children to switch to that cate-
gory (e.g., color) than odd-one-out trials based on relatively narrow categories (e.g.,
blue vs. green colors), even though the odd-one-out groupings across the condi-
tions were chosen from an identical set of colors. Therefore, we exposed children to
features from the postswitch dimension during the first odd-one-out.
The odd-one-out phase started with the experimenter
removing the target cards to minimize potential conflict
from extraneous stimuli4. The experimenter then announced,
“Okay, now I’m going to show you four things, and one of the
things is not like the other things. One thing is different. And
I want you to tell me which one is different.” The experi-
menter then demonstrated by saying, “First it’s my turn. I’m
looking very carefully at these four things and I think THIS
one is different,” while pointing to the correct odd-one-out
picture. The child was then invited to complete five odd-
one-out trials and select the “different” picture. The rule by
which the odd-one-out should be chosen was not explicitly
stated and feedback was not given. Data in the odd-one-out
tasks were analyzed in terms of proportion of trials answered
correctly.
(3) Postswitch: The postswitch phase started with the experi-
menter reattaching the target cards to the sorting tray. The
experimenter then strongly emphasized the change of the
game: “Remember these? Now we are going to switch and
play a new game, called the color game. We are not going to
play the shape game anymore. No way! We are going to play
the color game and the color game is different. In the color
game, red ones go here and blue ones go here.” During the
postswitch phase, the rule was repeated for each of the six
trials (“Remember, in the color game, red ones go here and
blue ones go here.”). However, in postswitch no feedback was
given – the experimenter neutrally said “OK” after the child
placed each card into a tray.
(4) Odd-one-out, different dimension: This phase was identical to
the first odd-one-out, but the relevant dimension was line
orientation. The experimenter once again removed the target
cards and invited the child to complete four trials by selecting
the picture that was “different.” The rule was not explained
and feedback was not provided.
(5) Perceptual priming (Figure 1B): Children saw a series of 10
complete (non-fragmented) line drawings of commonobjects
(selected from Cycowicz et al., 2000) on a computer screen,
presented for 2 s each5. Children were then shown 10 new and
10 old pictures, fragmented as in Cycowicz et al. (2000) and
were asked to guess the names of each picture.
RESULTS
As in previous studies (e.g., Kirkham et al., 2003), children were
classified as switchers or perseverators due to non-normal data
in the postswitch phase. Twenty-two children switched (sorted at
least five out of six postswitch trials correctly), and 25 children
perseverated (sorted no more than one out of six postswitch trials
correctly). The relationship between performance on the first odd-
one-out task and switching did not depend on age [Wald(1)= 1.4,
4When designing the study, we were unaware of the recent finding showing that
removing the target cards improves DCCS performance (Mack, 2007). It does not
appear that removing the cards drastically improved switching in our study, as
elaborated in the Section “Discussion.”
5We selected the stimuli for our 3-year-old participants based on lexical develop-
ment norms (Dale and Fenson, 1996); all but one of the 20 chosen pictures (95%)
were known by at least 93% of 30-month old children (the oldest age in the norms),
and the remaining picture was known by 70% of them.
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FIGURE 2 | Switchers performed better than perseverators at
abstracting the relevant dimension on odd-one-out tasks, (A) before
the switching task, and (B) requiring the abstraction of a dimension
(orientation) not previously used in the switching task. Both groups
performed better than chance (ps<0.006), indicated by the horizontal lines.
Error bars represent SEM.
p = 0.2] or the type of DCCS game [switching from color to
shape, or from shape to color; Wald(1)= 0.92, p = 0.3]. Hence,
the following analyses collapse across these factors.
Across both of the odd-one-out tasks, both switchers and
perseverators performed above chance (i.e., above 25% correct),
both ps< 0.006, demonstrating a rudimentary ability to com-
pare and contrast items based on category membership. How-
ever, switchers picked the odd-one-out more accurately than
perseverators on both the color/shape odd-one-out task that pre-
ceded switching [Switchers’ M = 0.62, SD= 0.28; Perseverators’
M = 0.45,SD= 0.29; t (45)= 2.0,p = 0.048;Figure 2A] andon the
unrelated orientation odd-one-out task that followed switching
[Switchers’M = 0.71,SD= 0.2; Perseverators’M = 0.50,SD= 0.2;
t (44)= 3.3, p = 0.002; Figure 2B].
The perceptual priming measure was successful in eliciting
priming, since old items (M = 5.3, SD= 0.44) were recognized
at a less fragmented level than new items (M = 5.8, SD= 0.44),
F(1,41)= 40.7, p< 0.001. Critically, perceptual priming did not
interact with switch status, F(1,41)= 1.1, p = 0.3 and also was
unrelated to both odd-one-out tasks, both ps> 0.3. Thus, even
though both switchers and perseverators performed better than
chance on the perceptual priming task (i.e., better than zero
difference between levels at which old and new items were rec-
ognized), both ps< 0.001, the two groups did not differ in their
ability to remember precise perceptual details of pictures.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 1 demonstrated that the developmental link between
flexibility and abstraction is: (1) specific – performance on these
measures is unrelated to performance on a perceptual prim-
ing task that does not depend on the maturity of PFC regions
(Gabrieli et al., 1995; Schacter and Buckner, 1998; Schott et al.,
2002; Henson, 2003), (2) general across orthogonal dimensions,
such that switching from one dimension to another (e.g., from
color to shape) is related to the ability to reason abstractly within
a third, unrelated dimension (e.g., orientation), and (3) general
across temporal orderings, such that the link between flexibility
and generalization holds even when the abstraction task precedes
the switching task. Although these findings fit within frameworks
emphasizing the link between abstract and flexible thought, the
extent of this link is nonetheless surprising. The orientation odd-
one-out task should be quite easy: children only need to pick out
one line (e.g., a horizontal one) as different from three other lines
that are identical to each other (e.g., all vertical). Thus, it is remark-
able that children have difficulty with this task, and moreover, that
their performance is linked to their ability to switch on DCCS.
Why do children have such difficulty with the orientation odd-
one-out task? After all, even young infants show perceptual pop-
out effects for line orientation (Atkinson andBraddick,1992;Rieth
and Sireteanu, 1994), which might be expected to support accu-
rate performance on this task in the much older children tested
here. However, pre-attentive perceptual processes like those that
support pop-out effects are not always sufficient to support per-
formance in other tasks (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Sagi and
Julesz, 1985; Hansen and Hansen, 1988; Lachter et al., 2004; Gho-
rashi et al., 2010). For example, people can pre-attentively detect
target stimuli that vary on only one dimension, such as vertical
and horizontal lines among diagonal ones, and yet fail to identify
the orientation of these lines without deploying selective atten-
tion (Sagi and Julesz, 1985). Specifically, as the number of target
stimuli is increased, reaction times for the detection task remain
constant (consistent with pre-attentive, parallel processing), while
reactions times for the identification task increase (consistent with
serial, attentive processing).
Thus, distinct stimuli can pop-out pre-attentively, but further
processing of this information in the service of goals (e.g., for
identification in Sagi and Julesz, 1985, or manual selection in our
odd-one-out task) requires selective attention and likely recruits
distinct systems including PFC regions (Lieberman et al., 2004;
McClure et al., 2004; O’Reilly, 2010). For children with less devel-
oped PFC regions, these systems may not support such further
processing despite sensitivity in pre-attentive processes. If so, all
children in our odd-one-out task may exhibit sensitivity to the
target item in where they gaze, even though switchers are better
than perseverators at manually selecting the odd-one-out. We test
this possibility in Experiment 2 by using an eye-tracker.
Alternatively, it is possible that children’s poor performance
(and perseverators performing worse than switchers) reflected a
difficulty in switching to attending to the new dimensions, such as
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the postswitch dimension in the first odd-one-out, or the orienta-
tion dimension in the second odd-one-out that came after dealing
with color and shape dimensions.We test this possibility in Exper-
iment 2, by administering the orientation odd-one-out task first,
before the color/shape card sort. If the link between color/shape
switching and orientation odd-one-out were driven by persevera-
tors’ difficulty with switching to the orientation dimension, then
this link should no longer hold when the order of the tasks is
reversed.
The new ordering allows us to test another possibility regard-
ing Experiment 1. Results from the color/shape odd-one-out
task suggested that the link between flexibility and generaliza-
tion holds even when the abstraction task precedes the switching
task. It is possible, however, that this odd-one-out task primed
the postswitch dimension, thus helping children switch to it and
leading to the link between odd-one-out and switching. We do
not think this possibility is likely, because the color/shape odd-
one-out task in the present study did not appear to significantly
inflate switch rates6, minimizing the possibility that our effects
were driven by priming children to the postswitch dimension.
Experiment 2 tests this issue more directly, by using an unrelated
abstraction task prior to the switching task. If the results of Exper-
iment 1 were driven by priming the relevant dimension with the
color/shape odd-one-out game, or by asking children to switch to
a new dimension, then the link between flexibility and abstraction
should disappear when the abstraction task requiring the use of
one dimension precedes the flexibility task that requires use of
different dimensions.
Finally, Experiment 2 also tests the possibility that the link
between flexibility and abstraction is driven by cognitive processes
that are not measured by perceptual priming. We examine this
possibility by including a standardized intelligence measure.
EXPERIMENT 2
We test the generality of the flexibility–abstraction link, by having
the orientation odd-one-out task precede the color/shape card-
sorting task. We test the specificity of the flexibility–abstraction
link by assessing whether the link is driven by individual dif-
ferences in general intelligence. We also examine the basis for
children’s poor performance during the orientation odd-one-out
task by measuring where they look during the task. If children can
use pre-attentive perceptual processes to detect the odd-one-out,
and perseverators’difficultywith the task stems from limitations in
6In a pilot study in which the embedded odd-one-out task focused on an irrele-
vant dimension, size, a comparable number of children (5/12, or 42%;χ2(1)= 0.10,
p = 0.7) switched on the color/shape flexibility task. Although 42–47% switch rates
for our 40-month-olds (35–45months)may seemhigh relative to someother studies
(e.g., Carlson, 2005; Mack, 2007), they are compatible with our previous studies in
this geographic locationwith participants of similar demographics (e.g., 65% switch
rate with 45-month-olds in Kharitonova et al., 2009, Experiment 2, and 32% switch
rate with 39-month-olds in Kharitonova et al., 2009, Experiment 1). These results
suggest that neither removing the target cards nor using the postswitch dimension in
the odd-one-out phase drastically improved switching in our study. Different switch
rates are often observed across different labs (e.g., 38% switch rate in Mack (2007)
baseline vs. 10% switch rate in Zelazo et al. (1996), despite having the same study
design and virtually identical age ranges (36–41 vs. 36–42months). Our primary
analyses thus focus not on absolute switch rates, but on testing the relation between
switching and abstraction.
processing the relevant dimensional information in goal-relevant,
prefrontal regions, then perseverators and switchers should show
comparable sensitivity to the target item inwhere they look,despite
differences in their pointing performance.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-nine 3-year-olds (M= 3.4 years, range: 3.25–3.7 years; 22
boys) participated (23 in the shape to color condition 26 in color
to shape). Additional children were excluded from all analyses due
to failing the preswitch phase (N= 1) and for mixed performance
on the postswitch phase (N= 3). Participants were recruited from
a departmental participant pool. This study was approved by the
University of Colorado Institutional Review Board and informed
consentwas obtained froma parent of each participant before test-
ing. Children received a small prize and the parents of participants
tested in the laboratory were paid $5 for travel expenses.
Design and procedure
The experiment consisted of five phases and lasted approximately
30min.
(1) Odd-one-out, orientation dimension: The odd-one-out task
was programmed and executed using E-Prime (version 1.1),
and all responses were collected through aMagicTouch touch-
screen interface, in order to allow eye-gaze data to be collected
using the Tobii X50 eye-tracker, at the frequency of 50Hz. Par-
ticipants viewed the stimuli from a 60-cm distance and used a
wooden“magic pointing stick”to respond on the touchscreen.
Participants were first familiarized with the touch screen
and trained on responding using the stick by tapping one of
the four empty frames on the screen at a time, presented in
the same locations as the experimental stimuli. Experimenter
pointed to a location and asked participants to “poke” there,
making the frames disappear.
Participants were then told, “Now that you know how to
poke, we are going to play a game. In this game, you will see
pictures, and one of the pictures is going to be not like the
other, one of them is going to be different. I want you to poke
the one that looks different.”
The experimenter then demonstrated one trial by saying,
“First it’s going to be my turn to play. I am looking very care-
fully at all of these pictures [experimenter points to all four
pictures, in the order different from the tapping training], and
you know what? I think this one is different.” Experimenter
pointed to the picture that was different, holding the pointer
there for several seconds to making sure the child saw where
the different picture was, and then “poked” it with the stick,
making it disappear. The experimenter then said, “Now it’s
your turn to play. Can you poke the one that looks different?”
The stimuli then appeared on the screen and remained
there until the child made a response. The children were
invited to complete eight odd-one-out trials (the number of
trials was increased relative to Experiment 1 to increase task
reliability) and select the “different”picture. As in Experiment
1, the rule by which the odd-one-out should be chosen was
not explicitly stated and feedback was not given. As in the
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FIGURE 3 |The setup of the odd-one-out task in Experiment 2, include
a demonstration trial (performed by experimenter) and eight
experimental trials.
orientation odd-one-out task in Experiment 1, in each trial
three lines were identical and one had a different orientation.
The order of target location was counterbalanced across eight
trials (Figure 3). On each trial, we quantified the number of
eye gazes in each of the four regions of the screen where the
stimuli appeared,until the trial was terminated by the subject’s
response (Figures 5A,B).
(2) Preswitch, (3) Postswitch, and (4) Perceptual priming phases
were administered in the same way as in Experiment 1,minus
the detaching and reattaching of the target cards between
preswitch and postswitch phases, because the odd-one-out
task no longer intervened between them.
(5) KABC-II IQ measure. To test whether the link between flex-
ibility and abstraction is related to individual differences in
general intelligence, the triangles subset of the KABC-II test
(Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004) was administered to partici-
pants. This subtest of the IQ test requires children to assemble
plastic and foam shapes to match increasingly more complex
abstract designs. The administration of this subtest stopped
when children answered three consecutive questions incor-
rectly. We used the raw scores to control for absolute level
of intelligence proficiency. Results were identical with stan-
dardized scores, because raw scores and standardized scores
were highly correlated (R = 0.96, N = 44, p< 0.001), given
the narrow age range of participants.
RESULTS
Children again were classified as switchers (N = 29) and persever-
ators (N = 20), based on the same criteria as in Experiment 1.
Manual selection results
As in Experiment 1, both switchers and perseverators performed
above chance on the odd-one-out task (i.e., above 25% cor-
rect), both ps< 0.001, again indicating at least a rudimentary
ability to pick an odd-one-out item. The relationship between
performance on the odd-one-out task and switching did not
depend on age [Wald(1)= 0.9, p = 0.3] or the type of DCCS
game [switching from color to shape, or from shape to color;
Wald(1)= 0.11, p = 0.7]. Hence, the following analyses collapse
across these factors.
Consistent with our predictions and our results from Experi-
ment 1, switchers picked the odd-one-out more accurately than
perseverators on the orientation odd-one-out task (Switchers’
M = 0.51 correct, SD= 0.26; Perseverators’M = 0.38, SD= 0.15),
t (47)= 2.0, p = 0.047 (Figure 4). The perceptual priming task
again successfully elicited priming, such that old items (M = 5.5,
SD= 0.60) were recognized at a less fragmented state than new
items (M = 6.1, SD= 0.41), F(1,44)= 63.0, p< 0.001. However,
once again, perceptual priming did not interact with switch status,
F(1,44)= 2.1, p = 0.2 and it was also unrelated to odd-one-out
performance, F(1,44)= 0.04, p = 0.9. The similarity in the results
across Experiments 1 and 2 was confirmed by adding Experi-
ment (1 or 2) as a factor into the regression. Only switch status
significantly predicted odd-one-out performance, F(1,91)= 4.0,
p = 0.048; the interaction between experiment and switch status
was not significant, F(1,91)= 0.76, p = 0.4. There was also a mar-
ginalmain effect of experiment [F(1,91)= 3.3,p = 0.07], such that
odd-one-out performance was marginally better in Experiment 1
than Experiment 2. There are many possible reasons for why the
overall levels of performance would differ, including the comput-
erized setup of Experiment 27. However, because the relationship
between switching and odd-one-out performance did not depend
on the experiment, we can conclude that this relationship holds
across task orders and other sources of variability in experiments
(e.g., different groups of children, computerized vs. paper-based
setup, etc.).
Switchers performed marginally better than perseverators on
the KABC spatial IQ subtest F(1,44)= 2.9, p = 0.094; however,
KABC performance was unrelated to odd-one-out performance,
F(1,44)= 0.94, p = 0.34, and did not mediate the relationship
7Another possibility is that being presented with the odd-one-out task after the
switching task (in Experiment 1) led children to perform better on the odd-one-out
task. Future work could test this possibility by manipulating the order of the tasks
while equating all other aspects of the study.
www.frontiersin.org November 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 347 | 7
Kharitonova and Munakata Scope of flexibility–abstraction link
FIGURE 4 | Odd-one-out performance in Experiment 2: Switchers again
performed better than perseverators at abstracting the relevant
dimension, even when the orientation odd-one-out task preceded the
color/shape flexibility task. Error bars represent SEM.
observed between switching and odd-one-out, as assessed through
a formal mediation analysis (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). Specif-
ically, the 95% confidence interval for the indirect (mediating)
effect of IQ is −0.02 to 0.10 (with a point estimate of 0.016;
SE= 0.028); because zero is included in the interval, themediating
effect of IQ on the flexibility–abstraction link is not significant.
This mediation analysis generates this estimate via 5000 boot-
strap samples, thus making no assumptions about the normality
of the sampling distribution of the indirect effect of IQ on the
relationship between switching and odd-one-out.
Eye-tracking results
Also consistent with our predictions, children showed high sen-
sitivity in looking at the target items in the odd-one-out task,
even on trials where they failed to “poke” these targets. Unsur-
prisingly, children looked most at the items they poked, such that
poked stimuli received 56% of the total gazes to the four stim-
uli, while non-poked stimuli received only 14% of total gazes on
average, F(1,47)= 188.3, p< 0.001 (Figure 5A). Critically, even
when children poked the wrong stimulus, they looked more at
the target (M = 18.2% of gazes, SD= 11.0) than at both the aver-
age non-poked distractor on those incorrect trials (M = 14.5% of
gazes, SD= 6.3%),F(1,47)= 149.4,p< 0.001, and the average dis-
tractor on the correct trials (M = 13.7% of gazes, SD= 7.2), F(2,
94)= 101.4, p< 0.001 (Figure 5B). This pattern did not interact
with switch status (both ps> 0.4), such that switchers and per-
severators showed similar gaze sensitivity to the target item over
non-reached distractors.
Finally, there was a marginal interaction between switch status
and stimulus type [F(1,47)= 3.6, p = 0.06], such that persevera-
tors spent more time looking at the target (M = 60.3%) relative to
distractors (M = 13.2%) than did switchers (M = 51.7% of gazes
to targets, 16.1% of gazes to distractors). This pattern suggests that
switchers engaged in a more active comparison process across the
four stimuli in order to select an answer. No other main effects or
interactions were significant, all Fs< 1.6.
FIGURE 5 | Eye-gaze data on the orientation odd-one-out task.
(A) Unsurprisingly, children looked most at the items they pointed to in
each trial, regardless of accuracy. (B) Critically, even when children poked
the wrong stimulus, they looked more at the target than at both the
average non-poked distractor on those incorrect trials and the average
distractor on the correct trials, indicating some sensitivity to the correct
answer. Switchers and perseverators did not differ in this pattern,
suggesting that visually detecting these targets is independent of cognitive
flexibility. The proportions do not add to 1.0 because gazes to Non-reached
stimuli and Distractors were computed as averages (i.e., as the total
number of gazes to all of the candidate stimuli divided by the number of
stimuli), for comparison to the single Reached or single Target stimulus.
Error bars represent SEM.
DISCUSSION
Consistent with the active–latent framework that posits a strong
link between flexible and abstract thought, we found that children
who switched from one card-sorting rule to another performed
better on the preceding orientation odd-one-out task than chil-
dren who perseverated on the first rule in the card-sorting task.
These results suggest that the flexibility–abstraction link is general
across dimensions (orientation, color, or shape) and ordering of
tasks (abstraction preceding or following switching). Moreover,
this link may be specific to tasks that require the use of flexible and
abstract representations: there againwas no link betweenflexibility
and perceptual priming, as in Experiment 1, and although switch-
ers showed marginally higher IQs than perseverators, IQ was not
related to performance on odd-one-out and did not mediate the
relationship between switching and odd-one-out.
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Critically, the eye-tracking results suggested that children’s dif-
ficulty with the odd-one-out task was not due to their failure
to detect the target stimulus, given that children looked at the
target items more than at the non-reached distractors, even for
incorrectly answered trials. Looking at the target might reflect
pre-attentive perceptual processes, which are well developed for
children at this age. In contrast, goal-related processing, such
as manual selection of the different item in the odd-one-out
task, might require top-down selective attention toward the ori-
entation dimension, which might be immature, particularly in
perseverating children.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across two experiments we demonstrated that the link between
flexibility and abstraction is general across dimensions and task
orders, but may also be specific to tasks that rely on the matu-
rity of flexible and abstract mental representations. Experiment
1 showed the link holds when the abstraction task preceded the
flexibility task, and when the abstraction task required the use
of a different dimension than the flexibility task. Experiment 2
showed that this link holds even when the different dimension
task (orientation odd-one-out) preceded the flexibility task.
In addition, our studies demonstrate that the link between flex-
ibility and abstraction does not generalize to tasks that do not
depend upon active and abstract representations. Thus, there was
no link between flexibility and perceptual priming (Experiment 1
and 2) or gaze sensitivity (Experiment 2), consistent with the idea
that more mature PFC function does not improve performance
on all tasks. On these other measures, switchers and perseverators
demonstrated comparable understanding of basic task instruc-
tions and comparable gaze sensitivity to targets in the abstraction
task. Finally, performance on the spatial IQ task was not related to
odd-one-out performance and only marginally related to switch-
ing; critically, the link between flexibility and abstraction was not
mediated by spatial IQ performance.
It is of course not possible to assess all cognitive processes;
therefore, a possibility remains that switchers’ advantage extends
to processes that we were not able to measure. Future work
should continue examining the boundaries of the specificity of
the flexibility–abstraction link, by testing whether other cogni-
tive measures are related to this link. Our specificity results are
nonetheless consistent with findings that high working memory is
actually associated with worse performance on tasks where the use
of active and abstract representationsmight be counterproductive,
such as implicit category learning (DeCaro et al., 2008).
Our findings are also consistent with accounts emphasizing the
role of abstraction in developing cognitive flexibility (Vygotsky,
1962; Premack, 1984; Wallis et al., 2001; Gentner, 2003; Zelazo
et al., 2003; Jacques and Zelazo, 2005; Rougier et al., 2005; Bunge
and Zelazo, 2006). Our findings go beyond existing work in
important ways. Namely, our work demonstrates a link between
flexibility and abstraction when abstraction abilities are assessed
outside of a flexibility task, allowing for the independent assess-
ment of these processes and their relationship. In contrast, in some
studies children were required to have abstraction abilities to suc-
ceed on the preswitch task, such that switching abilities could not
be measured separately from abstraction abilities (as discussed
in Footnote 2). Other studies have demonstrated that switching
is easier when abstraction demands are reduced (Fisher, 2011;
Honomichi and Chen, 2011), and that abstraction is easier when
switching demands are reduced (Blaye and Jacques, 2009). These
experiments demonstrate that both switching and abstraction are
demanding, while our study demonstrates that these abilities go
together early in development.
Our findings pose a challenge for other accounts of persevera-
tion. For example, if the root of perseveration lies with the inability
to disengage from a previously relevant dimension (Kirkham
et al., 2003), or if perseverators’ difficulty lies with the inability
to conceptually redescribe the stimulus in terms of a conflicting
dimension (Perner andLang,2002;Kloo andPerner,2003), it is not
clear why perseveration would be related to performance on odd-
one-out tasks,where inhibition of previously relevant dimensions,
or the need to redescribe a stimulus in terms of a new dimension
is not necessary. Similarly, if perseveration is due to the inabil-
ity to activate a new rule after it has been ignored earlier in the
task (Muller et al., 2006), it is unclear why perseveration would be
related to performance on odd-one-out tasks, where the relevant
dimensions has not just been ignored. Instead, what is common
across the odd-one-out and generalization tasks is the need for
abstract representations.
We speculate that the link between flexibility and abstraction
in development reflects their common reliance on processes sup-
ported by PFC regions. One possibility is that both flexibility
and abstraction depend on active neuronal firing in the PFC
across delays and interference, which serves as a mechanism for
maintaining information in working memory (Miller and Cohen,
2001). These active representations can support flexible switch-
ing by maintaining the currently relevant task information in
working memory (Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Morton
and Munakata, 2002; Marcovitch et al., 2007; Towse et al., 2007;
Blackwell et al., 2009), and could support abstraction both in the
moment (while performing an abstraction task) and across devel-
opment (while forming abstract representations). In the moment,
the ability to maintain multiple items in working memory (e.g.,
two diagonal lines and one horizontal one) could support abstrac-
tion by allowing pair-wise comparisons to be made between stim-
uli to determine the relevant dimensional information (e.g., that
the stimuli vary only in orientation, Speed, 2010; Anthony Wag-
ner, personal communication, October 2009). Switchers’ more
distributed pattern of gazes is consistent with this idea, that bet-
ter working memory supports both their successful switching and
their ability to gaze among stimuli for purposes of comparison
in selecting the target. This perspective predicts that increasing
the working memory demands in the odd-one-out task (e.g., by
increasing the distance between stimuli, such that comparisons
between stimuli require them to be strongly maintained in work-
ing memory) should yield an even greater advantage for switchers
over perseverators.
Across development, the ability to maintain information in
working memory has been shown computationally to support the
formation of abstract representations, by supporting the mainte-
nance of a common higher-order representation (e.g., one that
eventually codes for the dimension of color) across the sequen-
tial presentation of multiple exemplars (e.g., red, blue, and yellow;
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Rougier et al., 2005). Additionally, a separate factor such as lan-
guage could mediate the simultaneous development of different
facets of PFC-supported processes, such as flexibility and abstrac-
tion (Vygotsky, 1962; Spelke, 2003; Jacques and Zelazo, 2005),
perhaps by supporting working memory processes (Adams and
Gathercole, 1995; Miyake et al., 2004; Noble et al., 2005). Future
work could test the role of working memory in supporting the
link between flexibility and abstraction, by assessing participants’
working memory and testing whether it mediates this link.
One might ask how flexibility and abstraction relate to other
aspects of executive function, and to other aspects of intelligence.
The relationships between executive functions and intelligence,
and the relationships among executive functions and among com-
ponents of intelligence, are highly debated (e.g., Suß et al., 2002;
Jurado and Rosselli, 2007; McGrew, 2009). Although spatial IQ
did not explain the link between flexibility and abstraction in
our study, some researchers have argued that using more active
and abstract representations might constitute an important com-
ponent of general intelligence (Conway et al., 2003; Gray et al.,
2003; Wendelken et al., 2008). If so, the observed link between
flexibility and abstraction might share variance with other exec-
utive functions, and with other measures of intelligence, such
as Raven’s Progressive Matrices, which are more demanding on
working memory and other executive processes (Crone et al.,
2009). For example, the relationship between working memory
and theory of mind disappears after controlling for more com-
prehensive IQ measures (Carlson et al., 2002), suggesting that
active working memory processes and some IQ measures share
much common variance. In contrast, other aspects of intelligence,
such as crystallized intelligence, do not rely on the integrity of
PFC regions (Duncan et al., 1995; Gray and Thompson, 2004),
and therefore, can be less related to executive functioning mea-
sures. Similarly, other aspects of executive function, such as shift-
ing mental sets, do not seem to be linked to intelligence (e.g.,
Friedman et al., 2006). We clearly cannot resolve here which par-
cellation of executive functions or intelligence is the best one,
but we speculate that children who switch on the DCCS and do
well on the odd-one-out tasks will show advantages on addi-
tional PFC-dependent cognitive measures, such as the Raven’s
Progressive Matrices (Crone et al., 2009), given the computa-
tional benefits of active and abstract representations (e.g., Rougier
et al., 2005; Pasnak et al., 2009). Future work testing such pos-
sibilities may inform not only an understanding of the develop-
mental bases of abstract and flexible thought, but also ongoing
debates about candidate components of executive function and
intelligence.
The current work thus provides evidence for the emergence of
an inherent link between flexibility and abstraction early in devel-
opment, and suggests that representational factors contribute to
developmental limitations in executive functions. Further work
should elucidate the developmental trajectory of the relation-
ship between flexible and abstract thinking across domains and
across the lifespan (Craik and Bialystok, 2006), and the dissocia-
tion between categorical, abstract processes and those relying on
more graded, stimulus-specific representations.
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